POLITICS in West Bengal has always been synonymous with violence, retaliatory actions, and deep political rivalry. The recent elections refreshed this tradition anew.
The Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP) achieved a historic victory by winning approximately over 200 seats, ending the 15-year rule of Mamata Banerjee-led Trinamool Congress (TMC). The defeat at the hustings is a major setback for Mamata and the party is now faced with internal divisions and a split.
Suvendu Adhikari emerged as a key face of the BJP and later assumed the office of the chief minister. However, the BJP’s victory had a long trail of bloodshed, destruction, arson, and the saga of political revenge. The entire period from March to May 2026, especially after the declaration of results, remained filled with waves of violence across the state.
Without understanding the political history of West Bengal, the current situation cannot be fully comprehended. After the TMC’s victory in the 2021 elections, severe violence was allegedly unleashed against BJP workers. In 2026, with the transfer of power, the roles were reversed. The BJP blamed TMC’s internal conflicts and the previous ruling party’s internal disputes, while the TMC accused the BJP of planned attacks and a communal agenda. Different sections of the media presented the situation from different angles. Some described it as pure political rivalry, while others pointed out communal targeting, especially attacks on Muslim areas and shops. This violence did not remain merely political; at many places, it also acquired a religious colour, which severely damaged the state’s communal harmony.
Signs of tension had begun to appear even before the electoral process started. During Ram Navami in March 2026, Hindu-Muslim clashes occurred in the Raghunathganj and Jangipur (Jiaganj) areas of Murshidabad district. On 27 March, during the Ram Navami procession, a dispute arose between two groups, which soon turned into stone pelting, vandalism, and arson. Many shops, especially those owned by Muslims, were targeted. Police arrested hundreds of people and increased security in the area. This incident further poisoned the electoral atmosphere because Murshidabad is counted among the state’s sensitive areas with a significant Muslim population, where political and religious tensions often become intertwined. Some observers described it as a purely communal clash, while others called it the result of party workers’ clashes during the election campaign.
Violence during the April voting phase remained relatively limited but was still worrying. In the first phase (23 April), reports emerged of crude bomb blasts, stone pelting, vehicle damage, and attacks on party agents in Murshidabad, Malda, Siliguri, Asansol, and other areas. Bomb blasts and stone pelting in Murshidabad’s Noda area affected the voting process. An attack took place on a BJP candidate’s vehicle in Asansol, while news of an alleged attack on a BJP candidate came from Kumarganj in Dakshin Dinajpur. Reports of voter intimidation and slogan-based clashes were received from Mathabhanga in Cooch Behar. Sporadic violence was also witnessed in South 24 Parganas, Howrah, Hooghly, and Nadia districts. The situation was not much different in the second phase (29 April). Voter turnout reached a record level of approximately 92 to 94 percent, but violence raised serious questions about the democratic process. The Election Commission deployed a large number of Central Armed Police Forces, but failed to prevent the clashes.
Immediately after the announcement of the election results, violence gained new intensity. The celebration of the BJP’s victory and the grief of TMC’s defeat triggered a series of retaliatory actions across the state. From 4 May till mid-May, clashes, arson, vandalism, and targeted attacks became common in Kolkata, Murshidabad, Howrah, North and South 24 Parganas, Asansol, Birbhum, Hooghly, Nadia, Bankura, and other districts.
The incident in Kolkata’s New Market (Hogg Market) attracted the most attention. On the evening of 5 May, multiple structures were demolished using bulldozers. The TMC alleged that BJP supporters targeted the TMC union office (North and Central Progressive Hawkers’ Union office), allegedly Muslim-owned meat shops, and other shops such as chicken shops and children’s clothing stores. Slogans of “Jai Shri Ram” echoed in the area. Shopkeepers closed their shops early out of fear, and terror spread across the entire area. Police were present on the spot but could not take effective action,
This incident became a symbol of “bulldozer justice” and remained a hot topic of intense discussion on social media. According to available reports (The Hindu, NDTV, Telegraph India, and India Today), these were not residential houses but commercial or temporary structures. Later, in mid-May, a government bulldozer action was also taken against illegal constructions in Tiljala after a factory fire, but it was a separate matter from the election violence and the court also imposed a stay on it.
Another heart-wrenching example of violence in the North 24 Parganas district was the murder in Barasat (Madhyamgram). On the night of 6 May, Suvendu Adhikari’s close associate Chandranath Rath, was shot dead. Rath, a former Indian Air Force staffer, was returning home when motorcycle-borne attackers stopped his vehicle and fired at close range. At least ten bullets were fired. Police formed a Special Investigation Team and arrested three sharpshooters, Mayank Raj Mishra, Vicky Maurya, and Raj Singh, from Uttar Pradesh and Bihar. Investigation revealed that it was a contract killing, and UPI transactions and CCTV footage played an important role in reaching the accused. This murder was a clear example of political revenge, and the BJP described it as a premeditated killing.
In Howrah district’s Ade Naraynpur, BJP worker Jadav Bor (45 years) was allegedly targeted by TMC supporters. On the night of 4 May, while returning home after celebrations, he was attacked and beaten to death. BJP worker Madhu Mondal (46 years) also died in a clash in New Town. According to TMC, two of its workers were beaten to death, including Abir Sheikh from Nanur in Birbhum and Biswajit Pattanaik from Beliaghata (Kolkata). TMC claimed that BJP’s “Harmad Bahini” i.e., armed groups, targeted their workers.
A long list of attacks on TMC offices emerged across the state. TMC offices in Tollygunge, Kasba, Baruipur, Kamardhati, Baranagar, Howrah, Baharampur (Murshidabad), Falta, Siliguri, Asansol (Jamuria), and other places were vandalised, set on fire, or painted saffron. Lenin’s old statue was broken in Jiaganj, Murshidabad. Incidents of stone pelting, arson, and intimidation were reported in Birbhum, Hooghly, Nadia, and South 24 Parganas. At some places, people were forced to flee their homes.
According to credible English and local media reports such as Reuters, The Hindu, Al Jazeera, and Muslim Mirror, a total of four to five people were killed in post-poll violence across the state. At least one to three of them were Muslims. The most prominent Muslim killing was that of Abir Sheikh, who was allegedly killed in an attack by BJP supporters. Other killings were mostly of political workers, including BJP’s Madhu Mondal (New Town), Jadav Bar (Howrah), and Chandranath Rath (North 24 Parganas), which were largely the result of political rivalry. Some Muslim organisations and specific media sources claimed that three Muslims were killed, including not only political workers but also ordinary citizens, while multiple reports also emerged of alleged communal attacks on Muslim shops, houses, and mosques in areas like Kolkata’s New Market, Murshidabad, Howrah, and North 24 Parganas. However, mainstream media and official reports describe these killings primarily as political violence rather than purely communal riots. No major killings were reported during the pre-poll and voting phases. Police made hundreds of arrests, but no separate official figure of Muslim killings on religious grounds was released.
During and after the West Bengal elections, several political leaders made inflammatory and communally charged speeches against Muslims. Most of these reports are linked to BJP leaders, with Suvendu Adhikari being the most prominent. However, various sources such as The Wire, Al Jazeera, The Hindu, and Muslim Mirror reported these incidents from different angles. Some described them as pure hate speech, while the BJP called them political statements or reactions.
The most serious allegations were levelled against Adhikari. He is accused of targeting Muslims in multiple speeches from 2021 to 2026. For example, he said that after the BJP’s victory, Muslim MLAs would be thrown out of the assembly. In his post-election speeches, he ignored Muslim voters and said, “Hindus have brought us to power, so I will work only for them.” On some occasions, he advised Muslims to leave Islam to become entitled to citizenship rights. In speeches against Bangladesh, he referred to the Israel-Gaza conflict and talked about “teaching a lesson,” which TMC described as “genocidal hate speech.” The Wire’s analysis of his speeches from 2021 to 2026 identified a systematic anti-Muslim pattern that included social boycott, support for violence, and conspiracy theories such as “infiltrators.”
Ritesh Tiwari, BJP MLA from Kashipur-Belgachhia, clearly stated after the victory that he would not work for Muslims because they did not vote for him. This statement went viral as a video and faced severe criticism because it was seen as contrary to constitutional responsibilities. BJP leader Hari Mishra faced allegations of hate speech during the election campaign in Nadia (Kalyani) on 23 April. He allegedly spread conspiracy theories against Muslims and claimed that Hindu festivals could not be celebrated in Muslim-majority areas. Citizens for Justice and Peace (CJP) demanded the registration of an FIR in this matter.
Regarding other BJP leaders and social media accounts, Bellingcat’s report stated that out of 499 social media posts from the BJP’s official accounts in Bengal and Assam, 194 qualified as hate speech according to the United Nations definition, in which Bengali Muslims were labelled as “illegal infiltrators.” Artificial intelligence-generated material was also used in the election campaign. Some local leaders encouraged “Jai Shri Ram” slogans and communal targeting. On the other hand, the BJP also accused TMC leaders, such as Kalyan Banerjee, of hate speech against Home Minister Amit Shah and the BJP. However, most reports of speeches against Muslims were related to BJP leaders.
The Association for Protection of Civil Rights (APCR) and some Muslim organisations spoke of communal targeting of Muslims and mosques, while mainstream media outlets such as Reuters, The Hindu, and Al Jazeera described these incidents mostly as part of political rivalry between TMC and BJP and did not confirm large-scale attacks on mosques separately. No separate official figure of attacks on mosques was released by the police or government. These figures are sensitive in nature and different sources present different narratives.
The APCR report covers incidents recorded between 4 May and 7 May in various districts of the state. According to the report, at least 34 incidents of violence were recorded in eight districts. Seven incidents each were reported in Cooch Behar and North 24 Parganas, followed by five each in South 24 Parganas and Kolkata Metro, three in Murshidabad, and four in Howrah. APCR stated that at least two people were killed in the violence, including one Muslim person who was allegedly killed in Gosanimari, Cooch Behar district, while trying to protect a mosque.
The report alleges that Muslims, Muslim-owned properties, mosques, cattle markets, meat shops, and Trinamool Congress offices and residences were targeted. According to the report, at least 54 properties were attacked or damaged, while at least 50 Muslims were affected physically or in other ways. According to APCR, the violence included attacks on mosques in Cooch Behar, demolition of Muslim-owned hotels in Barasat, vandalism of Muslim houses in Nandina and Abutara villages, attacks on hawkers and shopkeepers in Kolkata, and bulldozer processions targeting allegedly Muslim-owned establishments. The report categorises these incidents into various types of violence, including murder, assault, threats, attacks on properties, demolition, bulldozer violence, and what it describes as “economic blockade.” It documented 19 incidents of attacks on properties, 14 incidents of threats, four demolitions, and three incidents of bulldozer violence.
The report also alleges that in many incidents, the sale and transportation of non-vegetarian food were specifically targeted. It documented the forced closure of cattle markets in Howrah, Kolkata Metro, and South 24 Parganas, along with attacks on meat shops and Muslim-owned hotels in Barasat. The documented incidents include alleged attacks on three mosques in Cooch Behar, an attack on a mosque during a “Jai Shri Ram” procession in Gosanimari, vandalism of 15 Muslim houses in Nandina and Abutara villages, and an attack on an imam in Barsaibpur, Howrah district. The report further alleges that Muslim women were stopped from wearing hijab at Azad Hind College in Domjur, Howrah. In North 24 Parganas, the report documents attacks on mosques and the demolition of two Muslim-owned hotels in Barasat. It also mentions attempts to rename “En Para Masjid Bari Road” to “Netaji Pally Road” and “Siraj ud-Daulah Udyan” to “Shivaji Udyan.” The report also claims that in some parts of South 24 Parganas, BJP processions included threats and abuses, while processions were taken out against Jamaat-e-Islami, with allegations that the organisation had encouraged people to vote against the BJP. APCR stated that the incidents in the report were compiled from local sources because of “restrictions and gaps in mainstream reporting.” According to the organisation, these incidents do not represent isolated clashes but reflect a broad hostile environment.
Police arrested hundreds of people, with the number reported to be over 400, while more than 200 FIRs were registered. Additional Central Armed Police Forces were deployed and flag marches were conducted in various areas. Multiple Public Interest Litigations (PILs) were filed in the Calcutta High Court, in which the court issued orders for the safe return of victims and a stay on bulldozer actions. The National Human Rights Commission (NHRC) also took notice but its detailed report remained limited.
The reaction of human rights and Muslim organisations to the violence, hate speeches, and alleged communal targeting after the 2026 West Bengal elections also came to the fore. The APCR emerged as the most active organisation. Citizens for Justice and Peace (CJP) demanded the registration of an FIR over the alleged hate speech by BJP leader Hari Mishra. Other national organisations and civil society groups, such as Clarion India, Maktoob Media, Muslim Mirror, and the Indian American Muslim Council (IAMC), widely shared APCR’s report and condemned the alleged planned violence against Muslims. These organisations demanded independent investigations, compensation for victims, repair of religious sites, and the rule of law. The National Human Rights Commission had taken notice of violence concerns even before the elections and decided to send an investigation team, but no detailed public report on post-poll violence has been released so far.
At the international level, no major separate report or statement had come from Amnesty International, Human Rights Watch (HRW), or the United Nations till the filing of this report. However, international media organisations such as Al Jazeera and Reuters reported on the post-poll violence, mentioning communal elements and alleged targeting of Muslims. Some global observers and overseas Muslim organisations, such as IAMC, expressed concern and described it as part of “rising Islamophobia.” Publications like Frontline (The Hindu) and The Wire also published detailed reports on communal targeting, mentioning incidents of attacks on mosques, Muslim properties, and religious symbols. In summary, at the national level, APCR remained the most prominent organisation, presenting the most documented evidence, while CJP demanded legal action on hate speeches. The international reaction remained limited so far and mostly confined to media reports and human rights observers. Collectively, these organisations demanded independent investigations, protection of victims, restoration of communal harmony, and legal action.
This violence was a continuation of West Bengal’s long political history. Even after the 2021 elections, incidents of violence against BJP workers surfaced following TMC’s victory. Now, in 2026, with the change in power, the roles changed. This violence has created a major challenge in restoring law and order before the new BJP government. Suvendu Adhikari appealed that no kind of violence would be tolerated and that the BJP would prove itself different from TMC. Mamata Banerjee alleged that the BJP was carrying out retaliatory actions as soon as it assumed power. Human rights organisations, journalists, and observers appealed to all parties to show restraint.
In West Bengal, elections and transfers of power have often been bloody. The 2026 incident is also a link in the same chain. On one hand, record voter turnout showed public interest, while on the other, violence raised serious questions about the healthy functioning of democracy. The new government will not only have to focus on the development agenda but will also have to take concrete steps for the restoration of law and order, communal harmony, and political tolerance. These incidents are not merely statistics or lists but stories of human tragedies, families who lost their loved ones, shopkeepers whose years of hard work were destroyed in moments, and a state that repeatedly gets entangled in the cycle of violence. It is hoped that in the future, political changes will take place peacefully and the people of Bengal will be able to move forward on the path of development, stability, and peace.
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Mohammad Alamullah is a UK-based academic, author, and journalist, holding two Master’s degrees from Swansea University, UK, and Jamia Millia Islamia. He has authored three books: A Brief History of Muslim Majlis Mushawarat, Few Days in Iran, and Media: Paper to Screen — Scenarios, Problems and Possibilities. The views expressed are solely his own.
