The former military chief has received the mandate to form Israel’s next government, but the arithmetic is complicated and the political contradictions are formidable. Yet the October 27 election has opened a possibility that once seemed remote: the end of Benjamin Netanyahu’s prolonged political dominance and the beginning of a different chapter in Israeli politics
FOR Benjamin Netanyahu, the political ground is shifting. After years of dominating Israeli politics, surviving successive electoral crises, presiding over an increasingly polarised society and leading a government whose conduct during the Gaza war has attracted unprecedented international condemnation, the Israeli Prime Minister faces perhaps the most consequential challenge to his political future.
The emergence of former military chief Gadi Eisenkot as the person entrusted with forming Israel’s next government is therefore a significant political moment. It is not yet the end of the Netanyahu era, but it may be the beginning of its unravelling.
There is reason to regard this development as an important opening. Netanyahu’s departure, should Eisenkot succeed, would mark the conclusion of one of the longest and most consequential political careers in modern Israeli history. It would also create an opportunity to reconsider the direction in which Israeli politics has travelled, particularly since October 7, 2023. Whether that opportunity translates into a fundamental change in policy, especially towards Palestinians, remains a much larger question.
Following the October 27, 2026 legislative election, President Isaac Herzog formally entrusted Eisenkot, leader of the Yashar party and a former Chief of Staff of the Israel Defense Forces, with the responsibility of forming a government on November 8. The decision followed consultations in which 67 members of the 120-member Knesset recommended Eisenkot for the mandate, compared with 46 who recommended Netanyahu. Seven members of the United Torah Judaism faction declined to recommend either candidate.
The distinction is important. Eisenkot has received the support of 67 parliamentarians for the opportunity to form a government, but this does not mean that he has 67 committed coalition votes. His four-party Jewish opposition alliance commands 48 seats, while the two Arab-led parties hold another 19. Bringing these political forces together into a functioning government is an entirely different challenge.
Under Israel’s Basic Law, Eisenkot has 28 days to form a government, with President Herzog empowered to grant an extension of up to 14 additional days. The clock has started, and the negotiations are likely to test not only his political skills but also the willingness of several ideologically incompatible parties to compromise.
The electoral arithmetic: Netanyahu weakened, but not defeated
The final election results reveal a fragmented political landscape.
Eisenkot’s Yashar party emerged with 21 seats, while its three opposition partners brought the alliance to 48. Netanyahu’s right-wing and religious bloc secured 53 seats. The two Arab-led political groupings, the Joint List and Ra’am, won 11 and eight seats respectively, giving them a combined 19 seats, an unprecedented parliamentary presence.
This is the central political reality of the election. Netanyahu’s bloc has lost the majority it needs to govern, but the opposition has not independently secured one either. Neither side can claim a straightforward mandate to govern.
The election has nevertheless changed the political equation. Netanyahu can no longer assume that his traditional coalition partners will automatically provide the parliamentary support necessary for another government. The opposition, meanwhile, has an opportunity to assemble a new arrangement, provided it can overcome its internal contradictions.
The 19 Arab-led seats have become central to this calculation. Their representatives recommended Eisenkot to the President, helping establish the parliamentary basis for his mandate. Their participation has also exposed a fundamental contradiction in Israeli politics: Arab citizens constitute a substantial part of the electorate and their representatives are now a decisive parliamentary force, yet several Jewish-led parties remain unwilling to accept their political participation in government.
The Arab parties: Kingmakers, but not necessarily coalition partners
The Joint List, with 11 seats, and Ra’am, with eight, have given the Arab political leadership an unprecedented opportunity to influence the formation of Israel’s next government.
Both parties recommended Eisenkot, signalling their willingness to facilitate a political transition away from Netanyahu. But their willingness to recommend a candidate should not be confused with agreement to join his government.
Ra’am leader Mansour Abbas has previously demonstrated a willingness to participate in Israeli coalition politics. His party’s experience in the Bennett-Lapid government established that Arab political representation could become an important component of parliamentary governance.
The Joint List has traditionally taken a different position, preferring to offer external parliamentary support rather than join a government. Its constituent political currents also have their own ideological differences, making a common position on coalition participation difficult.
Eisenkot, for his part, has ruled out bringing the Arab-led parties into his proposed government. His four principles for coalition partners include recognition of Israel as a Jewish and democratic state, acceptance of the values of the Declaration of Independence, mandatory military or national service for all citizens, and recognition of Hamas as a terrorist organisation, together with a commitment to ending its rule and dismantling its military capabilities in Gaza.
These conditions create difficulties for negotiations with the Arab parties, particularly over the definition of national service, the war in Gaza and the political treatment of Palestinian citizens of Israel.
There is another complication. Avigdor Liberman, whose Yisrael Beiteinu party has seven seats and is part of Eisenkot’s four-party alliance, has opposed a government dependent on Arab-party support. Other partners also have reservations about such an arrangement.
Consequently, the 19 Arab-led seats may provide external support for a minority government, but this would require Eisenkot to overcome objections within his own alliance. It would also require an agreement with Arab political representatives that goes beyond the immediate objective of preventing Netanyahu’s return.
The question is whether Israeli politics is prepared to recognise that Arab parliamentary representation is a legitimate and necessary part of democratic governance, rather than treating it as an arrangement of political convenience.
The Haredi parties: An unexpected opening?
If the Arab-party route proves politically impossible, Eisenkot has another possibility: negotiating with the ultra-Orthodox parties, Shas and United Torah Judaism.
Together, they hold 13 seats. Their support, added to the 48 seats of Eisenkot’s existing alliance, would produce exactly the 61-seat majority required to form a government.
The possibility is intriguing because the Haredi parties have traditionally been associated with Netanyahu’s governing arrangements. Yet the October 27 election has introduced new calculations.
United Torah Judaism, which has seven seats, refused to recommend either Netanyahu or Eisenkot during the presidential consultations. This is significant. It does not establish that UTJ is prepared to join an Eisenkot government, but it indicates that the party has not committed itself to Netanyahu’s continuation in office.
Shas, with six seats, recommended Netanyahu, making its position more complicated. Nevertheless, reports of possible discussions about the military draft crisis suggest that the political situation may not be entirely closed.
The central obstacle is conscription.
The Israeli military enlistment crisis has become a major issue of contention between secular and religious political constituencies. Ultra-Orthodox parties have long sought exemptions for yeshiva students from compulsory military service. The Supreme Court’s 2024 ruling against the existing exemption arrangements and the continuing manpower requirements of the military have intensified the dispute.
Eisenkot’s demand for universal military or national service is therefore a direct challenge to the traditional Haredi position.
For Shas and UTJ, joining a government that insists on ending existing exemptions could create a serious political problem with their own constituencies. For Eisenkot, compromising on universal service could undermine one of the central principles on which he has built his political appeal.
Yet the very existence of this negotiating possibility is important. It suggests that the political alignments sustaining Netanyahu are not necessarily permanent. The Haredi parties must weigh their traditional political relationships against the practical demands of their constituencies and the changing parliamentary situation.
Liberman’s position and the contradictions within the opposition
Eisenkot’s greatest difficulty may not be Netanyahu’s political manoeuvring but the contradictions within his own alliance.
The four Jewish-led opposition parties bring together political constituencies with very different ideological positions. Naftali Bennett’s Together represents a centre-right constituency, Yair Golan’s Democrats are positioned on the centre-left, while Avigdor Liberman’s Yisrael Beiteinu represents a secular nationalist right-wing constituency. Eisenkot’s Yashar occupies the political centre.
Their common objective is to replace Netanyahu, but agreement on that objective does not automatically translate into agreement on government policy.
Liberman has been particularly categorical about his opposition to a government dependent on Arab-party support. However, reports following the election suggest that he may be prepared to consider cooperation with ultra-Orthodox parties if they accept a meaningful military-service arrangement.
This could open a route towards a 61-seat government without relying on the Arab parties. But it would require Shas and UTJ to make concessions on an issue that has been central to their political identity.
The possibility of a deal involving the Haredi parties is therefore more than a parliamentary calculation. It could reshape the traditional political alliances that have sustained Netanyahu.
The challenge for Eisenkot is to keep his alliance together while negotiating with parties whose demands may be mutually incompatible. A coalition assembled simply to remove Netanyahu could find itself unable to agree on the policies required to govern the country.
A national unity government: An alternative or a political trap?
Netanyahu has not accepted the prospect of political displacement quietly. He has called for a national unity government involving Eisenkot and other Zionist parties, presenting it as an appropriate response to Israel’s security challenges.
Such an arrangement would be politically complicated. Netanyahu remains the leader of the largest single party, Likud, with 27 seats. His wider right-wing bloc has 53. A unity government could therefore offer a parliamentary solution, but it would also raise the question of who would lead it.
Several of Eisenkot’s partners have made opposition to Netanyahu central to their political positions. They are unlikely to accept an arrangement that simply returns him to the premiership through a different coalition formula.
There is also the question of whether such a government would genuinely represent a departure from the policies of the outgoing administration. If the same political leadership and ideological forces retain decisive influence, the promise of a new beginning could be substantially diluted.
Nevertheless, a split within Likud or a willingness among some of its parliamentarians to support a different administration could create additional possibilities. Eisenkot has appealed to members of the broader right-wing political establishment to consider joining a national emergency government.
This is one of the less predictable dimensions of the negotiations. Netanyahu’s political strength has historically depended on maintaining discipline among his coalition partners. If that discipline weakens, the possibility of a political realignment cannot be dismissed.
Why Netanyahu’s possible departure matters
Netanyahu’s political longevity has been extraordinary. But longevity should not be confused with an enduring national consensus.
His critics have questioned his handling of the October 7 security failure, the prolonged war in Gaza, the absence of a lasting political settlement, the continuing divisions within Israeli society and the deterioration of Israel’s international standing.
His government’s confrontation with the judiciary and the controversy surrounding the proposed judicial overhaul also exposed profound divisions within Israel. Before the Gaza war, hundreds of thousands of Israelis had participated in demonstrations against the judicial changes.
The election has provided a parliamentary expression of some of these frustrations. It has not established that all Israelis who voted against Netanyahu share the same political vision. Indeed, Eisenkot’s alliance includes parties with sharply different views on religion, military service, the economy and the Palestinian question.
Nevertheless, the possibility of a leadership transition is important. It could create space for accountability, a reassessment of security policy and a different relationship between the government and Israeli democratic institutions.
Internationally, a new administration would also face the task of rebuilding confidence among diplomatic partners and addressing Israel’s deteriorating standing. Its relationship with the United States, the international response to the war in Gaza and its engagement with international institutions would all demand attention.
A change in government could create an opportunity for a different diplomatic approach. But the international community would have to judge the new administration by its actions rather than its promises.
Palestine: The real test of a new Israeli government
For Palestinians, however, the question is much larger than who occupies the Prime Minister’s office in Jerusalem.
Eisenkot is no political outsider to Israel’s security establishment. He served as Chief of Staff of the Israeli military between 2015 and 2019 and subsequently participated as an observer in Netanyahu’s war cabinet during the first eight months of the Gaza war.
His military background and political positions do not suggest an automatic departure from the prevailing Israeli security consensus.
It would therefore be premature to interpret his emergence as evidence that Israel is ready to recognise Palestinian national rights or abandon its existing policies in the occupied territories.
The central issues remain unchanged: the occupation of Palestinian land, settlement expansion, the continuing dispossession of Palestinians, the blockade and destruction in Gaza, restrictions on Palestinian freedom of movement, and the absence of a credible political horizon for Palestinian self-determination.
There is little indication that Eisenkot’s proposed coalition has developed a comprehensive alternative to Netanyahu’s approach on these questions. Many of the Jewish-led opposition parties disagree with Netanyahu on governance and security policy while continuing to operate within a political consensus that does not embrace Palestinian statehood.
This is where the limits of political optimism must be recognised. A government without Netanyahu is not necessarily a government committed to justice for Palestinians. A change of prime minister is not the same as an end to occupation, and a change in diplomatic language cannot substitute for a change in political reality.
Yet a government less dependent on the far-right parties of the outgoing coalition could create opportunities for different conversations. It could reduce the influence of ministers who have advocated further territorial expansion and displacement. It could also reopen space for international engagement and a more serious discussion about the political future of Palestinians and Israelis.
Whether Eisenkot is willing and able to pursue such a direction will have to be judged by his government’s actions.
The next 28 days: A decisive political test
Eisenkot now faces a difficult negotiating period. His 28-day mandate, with the possibility of a further 14-day extension, will determine whether the parliamentary opening created by the election can be converted into a functioning government.
Three broad possibilities deserve particular attention.
The first is an arrangement with the Haredi parties, particularly if UTJ and Shas become willing to negotiate over military service. This would provide a route to a 61-seat majority without formally relying on Arab-party support.
The second is a minority government supported from outside by the Arab-led parties. Such an arrangement would be politically significant, but would require Eisenkot to resolve the objections of Liberman and other partners. It would also require a working understanding with Arab representatives on issues extending well beyond the immediate removal of Netanyahu.
The third is a broader political realignment involving dissident members of Likud or other right-wing political forces. This could produce a national emergency government, although its composition and leadership would determine whether it represents a genuine political departure.
There is also the possibility of failure. If Eisenkot cannot bridge the differences, the mandate could return to President Herzog. Netanyahu may then receive an opportunity to attempt government formation. If the political process remains deadlocked, another election could become necessary.
None of these outcomes can yet be ruled out.
But there is an important distinction between the situation before and after October 27. Netanyahu’s political dominance has been challenged at the ballot box, his bloc has fallen short of a parliamentary majority, and a substantial cross-section of the Knesset has recommended an alternative leader.
That is not a trivial development.
An opening that should not be underestimated
The prospect of a post-Netanyahu Israel is worth watching with cautious hope. It is not a reason for Palestinians to lower their expectations, nor for the international community to relax its scrutiny. A new government would have to demonstrate that it understands the necessity of a different future.
Netanyahu’s departure, if it happens, would close an important chapter in Israeli politics. It would remove a leader whose tenure has become inseparable from some of the most consequential crises in the country’s contemporary history. But the real test of a successor will be whether he can move Israel away from the politics of endless war and towards a political framework that acknowledges the rights, dignity and freedom of the Palestinian people.
The coming weeks will reveal whether the parties that recommended Eisenkot are prepared to make the compromises necessary to translate their parliamentary support into a government. They will also reveal whether Arab political representation can be treated as a legitimate part of Israel’s democratic process, whether the Haredi parties are prepared to reconsider their traditional positions, and whether the secular and religious right can find common ground on military service.
The departure of one political leader cannot dismantle an entire political system. Nor should the replacement of Netanyahu be mistaken for the arrival of a new Israeli political consensus. But political change often begins with the weakening of an established order and the emergence of possibilities that previously appeared unattainable.
For now, Netanyahu’s continuation in office is no longer a political certainty. Eisenkot has an opportunity, although by no means an assured path, to construct an alternative.
The door to a different political chapter has opened. Whether Israel is prepared to walk through it remains to be seen. For Palestinians and for all those who continue to hope for a just and lasting peace, the most important question is not simply whether Netanyahu leaves office, but whether the political space that follows his departure can finally be used to confront the realities of occupation, dispossession and the denial of Palestinian freedom.
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Ranjan Solomon is a writer, researcher and activist based in Goa. He has worked in social movements since he was 19 years of age. The views expressed here are the author’s own and Clarion India does not necessarily share or subscribe to them. He can be contacted at [email protected]
