THE upcoming second round of high-stakes talks between Iran and the US in Geneva aims to curb Iran’s nuclear programme in exchange for significant sanctions relief, potentially averting further regional military conflict. Oman, acting as a key mediator, will be required to balance the obstinate positions of both sides.
Discussions may yield a step-by-step deal, including economic incentives such as oil and mining investments. The talks follow a non-breakthrough first round with both sides attempting to avoid a full-scale conflict.
Iran has signalled a willingness to limit uranium enrichment in exchange for the lifting of US sanctions. A possible three-step scenario will see Iran halt high-level enrichment and restore IAEA inspections.
The talks are also focusing on mutual economic benefits, including potential US investments in Iranian oil, gas, and mining, as well as aircraft sales, to make the agreement durable.
De-escalation measures will form part of the key negotiations with the intention to prevent further military escalation in the Middle East. Proposals may include steps for Iran to curb actions by regional alliances, including Hamas, Houthis, and Hezbollah. The US refuses to countenance them and wants Iran to disown them.
Iran remains deeply committed to this so-called “Axis of Resistance” which constitutes its network of allied militant groups, including Hezbollah, the Houthis, and various Iraqi factions. It is highly unlikely to abandon this strategy despite intense pressure. While the coalition has faced significant degradation in capability following sustained Israeli and US actions in 2024 and 2025, Tehran views this alliance as a fundamental pillar of its “forward defence” against Israel and the United States.
Iran’s leadership, particularly within the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC), views the Allied partners as crucial for projecting power, maintaining regional influence, and securing its borders. The alliance enables Iran to challenge adversaries without direct, full-scale, nation-to-nation warfare.
Following the severe weakening of Hezbollah and the fall of the Bashar al-Assad regime in Syria by early 2025, Tehran has shifted toward a strategy of rebuilding, reorganising, and “strategic dormancy” for its allied partners, rather than disowning them.
Although the Allies chose to be quiet during direct Israel-Iran confrontations in June 2025, this was a calculated, temporary decision by Tehran to avoid broader escalation while under intense pressure, not a sign of the alliance breaking.
Despite internal economic turmoil and pressure from the US (particularly under a potential return of Trump-era policies), the Iranian leadership has indicated it will not surrender its regional leverage and will continue to support its allies to counter foreign influence.
Still, Iran will negotiate around an agenda that has a limited scope. While Iran desires to focus on the nuclear file, the US has pushed for a wider framework covering ballistic missiles and regional activities.
The US is concurrently maintaining high pressure, including the deployment of a second aircraft carrier in the region, to ensure negotiations are taken seriously. The US deployment of a second aircraft carrier and threats of military action against Iran, while pushing for a swift, comprehensive deal, have severely heightened regional tensions, creating a “maximum pressure” environment. While this escalation risks a direct conflict, it is designed to force Tehran into concessions within a one-month deadline. Both sides still appear willing to engage, with consultations for further talks continuing, indicating the strategy is being used as leverage to compel a deal that addresses nuclear and, potentially, regime-change goals.
The military build-up, combined with sanctions, is intended to force Iran to accept a new deal, with President Donald Trump setting a short, one-month deadline to avoid a “traumatic” outcome. These negotiations come with high stakes. Iran has indicated a willingness to compromise if the US addresses sanctions, but warns that further attacks would be costly. The situation is delicate, with potential for a miscalculation to lead to a broader regional conflict. The US has signalled readiness to act, if a deal is not reached. The alternative is risking escalation.
Israel maintains a highly active, often covert, role in Iran, frequently operating behind the scenes while influencing or leveraging United States policy. This “shadow war” involves intelligence operations, cyber warfare, and targeted strikes designed to degrade Iran’s nuclear and military capabilities. Israel’s Mossad has conducted extensive operations inside Iran, including the assassination of nuclear scientists and military leaders. Following a major escalation in June 2025, reports indicated that Israeli agents were responsible for sabotaging drone bases and nuclear sites.
Israel significantly impacts Washington’s perspective on potential actions against Iran. While the US sometimes acts as a constraint, it often provides a security umbrella under which Israel operates.
The internal crises in Iran have not calmed as of early 2026; rather, they remain intense following nationwide upheavals that began in late 2025, driven by economic collapse, severe sanctions, and water shortages. The country is grappling with massive inflation, high unemployment, and currency depreciation, further strained by new UN sanctions in September 2025.
As of early 2026, the Iranian government is implementing several measures to attempt to stabilise its crashing economy and address, with mixed results, the widespread protests that followed the severe devaluation of the rial (reaching 1.4–1.6 million to the US dollar). Steps are being taken or announced by the Iranian authorities to calm the economic crisis.
Iran has replaced its Central Bank governor. Parliament has approved a plan to cut four zeros from the national currency, with the new rial (to be subdivided into “qerans”) designed to simplify transactions, though this is seen as a primarily cosmetic measure.
To bypass banking sanctions, the Agriculture Ministry is expanding a barter scheme, allowing importers of essential goods to directly receive and sell Iranian oil cargoes to finance their imports. The government has also announced changes to the subsidy system to help manage rising inflation and food prices, which have seen massive increases. There is a new 5 million-rial “Iran-cheque” to facilitate transactions amidst high inflation, which is currently running at over 40-50%.
While sanctions have had a devastating effect on the economy, Iran is now likely to add potential compromises on its uranium stockpile in exchange for lifting some sanctions. The crisis is compounded by the “maximum pressure” campaign from the US and Israel, which is targeting Iranian oil exports to China.
The diplomatic landscape in Geneva is dominated by high-stakes, indirect negotiations regarding Iran’s nuclear programme, set to resume on Tuesday (February 17). The prognosis for these talks is cautious, characterised by intense pressure from the Trump administration for a “zero enrichment” deal, while Iran shows signs of willingness to compromise despite deep distrust following a major escalation in June 2025.
The talks aim to prevent further military confrontation and address the nuclear dispute, with US negotiators pressing for broad concessions. While Iran is signalling a potential willingness to compromise, Israel is pushing for the complete dismantling of enrichment capabilities, adding further pressure to the negotiation table. Parallel, technical talks are occurring with the UN nuclear watchdog, IAEA.
The way forward in Geneva rests on whether the current US-Iran indirect negotiations can overcome deep-rooted distrust and substantial disagreements over the scope of Iran’s nuclear and regional activities.
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Ranjan Solomon is a writer, researcher and activist based in Goa. He has worked in social movements since he was 19 years of age. The views expressed here are the author’s own and Clarion Indiadoes not necessarily share or subscribe to them. He can be contacted at ranjan.solomon@gmail.com
