Withdrawal from NPT would facilitate a reconstitution of Iran’s bombed nuclear capabilities and enable Tehran to use them to develop nuclear weapons without international oversight
RECENT remarks by Hakan Fidan, Turkish Foreign Minister, that both the United States and Iran have shown willingness to find common ground on a nuclear agreement reopen a familiar but unresolved question: whose security counts in the Middle East, and whose does not?
Fidan’s warning that expanding negotiations to include Iran’s ballistic missile programme could trigger “another war” is not alarmist rhetoric. It reflects a deeper structural imbalance that has defined the region’s nuclear debate for decades. At the heart of this imbalance lies an uncomfortable truth: Iran is under constant scrutiny, inspection, and sanction for its nuclear activities, while Israel — widely understood to possess nuclear weapons — remains outside the global non-proliferation regime altogether.
This asymmetry is not accidental. It is built into the architecture of international law and geopolitics.
The Treaty That Binds Some, Not All
Iran is a signatory to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT). As such, it is legally bound to allow inspections of its nuclear facilities and to refrain from developing nuclear weapons. The International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) monitors its enrichment levels, centrifuge installations, and uranium stockpiles.
Israel, by contrast, never joined the NPT. Its nuclear facilities are not subject to comprehensive IAEA safeguards. It maintains a policy of deliberate ambiguity—neither confirming nor denying possession of nuclear weapons—while benefiting from the strategic protection of Washington.
The consequence is stark: Iran’s civilian enrichment programme is treated as a global crisis; Israel’s undeclared nuclear arsenal is treated as a strategic given. This is not merely a legal technicality. It shapes the political narrative. Iran is framed as a “threshold” state that must be contained. Israel is framed as a responsible steward of deterrence.
The Collapse of the 2015 Framework
The 2015 nuclear agreement—formally known as the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action—demonstrated that negotiated limits were possible. Under that framework, Iran reduced enrichment levels, limited centrifuge use, and accepted intrusive inspections in exchange for sanctions relief.
Yet the deal collapsed not because inspectors found Iran in material breach, but because Washington withdrew in 2018. The reimposition of sanctions triggered a predictable cycle: Iran gradually expanded enrichment, and Western powers cited that expansion as justification for renewed pressure.
The lesson was corrosive. Compliance did not guarantee stability. Agreements could be reversed by a political change in Washington. Trust, already fragile, eroded further. The renewed diplomatic signals exist in the shadow of that breakdown.
The Missile Question: Red Line or Escalation?
Fidan’s warning about including Iran’s ballistic missile programme in negotiations touches a red line for Tehran. From Iran’s perspective, its missile capability is not a bargaining chip but a defensive necessity. Surrounded by US military bases in the Gulf and confronted by Israel’s superior air power, Iran sees missiles as its principal conventional deterrent.
Expanding negotiations beyond nuclear enrichment into missile disarmament risks shifting from non-proliferation into unilateral strategic weakening. It transforms the talks from limiting nuclear risk to restructuring regional power balances.
That is why Fidan speaks of the danger of “another war.” If negotiations become a vehicle for stripping Iran of its deterrent capacity without corresponding constraints on Israel’s arsenal, Tehran may calculate that confrontation is preferable to vulnerability.
The Double Standard Problem
The broader issue is not whether Iran should be monitored. All nuclear programmes warrant transparency. The issue is whether non-proliferation is applied universally or selectively.
A truly principled approach would advance a Middle East Nuclear-Weapon-Free Zone—a proposal discussed at the United Nations for decades. Such a framework would require Israel to acknowledge and dismantle its arsenal under international verification while preventing further proliferation elsewhere.
But that proposal has stalled because Israel links its nuclear posture to comprehensive regional peace and recognition agreements. Meanwhile, Washington treats Israel’s deterrent as untouchable while pressing Iran to demonstrate restraint beyond its treaty obligations. This double standard fuels regional resentment. It also weakens the legitimacy of global non-proliferation norms. If rules bind adversaries but not allies, they appear less like law and more like instruments of power.
Security for Whom?
The United States argues that preventing Iran from developing a nuclear weapon is essential to avoid a regional arms race. Saudi Arabia has hinted it would seek nuclear capability if Iran crosses the threshold. Turkey and Egypt would face similar strategic calculations.
That logic has merit. Proliferation cascades are destabilising.
Yet the same argument applies to Israel’s undeclared arsenal. Its existence has long shaped Iran’s strategic calculations. Iranian leaders frequently point to Israel’s nuclear capability as evidence of imbalance and threat.
Security cannot be compartmentalised. It is relational. One state’s deterrent is another’s provocation. If Washington genuinely seeks a nuclear-free Middle East, it must confront this symmetry. Otherwise, efforts to constrain Iran will continue to appear as containment rather than non-proliferation.
IAEA’s Delicate Position
The IAEA occupies a difficult space. Its mandate is technical verification, not political arbitration. Yet its reports carry immense geopolitical weight. When it accelerates inspections or highlights enrichment concerns, those findings become ammunition in diplomatic battles.
Iranian officials often argue that the Agency operates under Western pressure. The IAEA insists it acts within legal safeguards. The truth likely lies in the structural reality: institutions do not operate in a vacuum. When major powers frame urgency as existential, even technical bodies are drawn into political gravity.
That perception problem is as significant as any centrifuge count.
If there is genuine willingness, as Fidan suggests, diplomacy must be narrowly defined and clearly sequenced.
First, restore compliance on the nuclear file alone – mutual steps, verifiable and reciprocal. Avoid expanding talks into missile disarmament at the outset.
Second, re-anchor discussions within the framework of international law rather than unilateral demands. If Iran’s enrichment is monitored under the NPT, Israel’s posture must at least enter regional dialogue.
Third, revive serious discussion of a regional nuclear-weapon-free zone. Even incremental confidence-building measures would signal movement toward fairness.
Without addressing asymmetry, negotiations risk perpetuating instability. Pressure without parity breeds resistance, not compliance.
Beyond Power Politics
The question at stake is moral as much as strategic: can international norms survive selective enforcement?
Non-proliferation should not be a tool of geopolitical hierarchy. It must be a universal principle, or it becomes suspect. Iran’s nuclear program deserves scrutiny; so does Israel’s arsenal. Security must be mutual to be durable.
Fidan’s caution is therefore not merely diplomatic prudence. It is recognition that expanding demands without addressing structural imbalance could ignite the very conflict that negotiations aim to prevent.
The Middle East does not need another war born of asymmetry. It needs consistency, reciprocity, and the courage to apply the law without fear or favour. Until that happens, every round of talks will carry the shadow of the same unresolved question: whose security is negotiable — and whose is guaranteed?
_______________
Ranjan Solomon is a writer, researcher and activist based in Goa. He has worked in social movements since he was 19 years of age. The views expressed here are the author’s own and Clarion India does not necessarily share or subscribe to them. He can be contacted at ranjan.solomon@gmail.com
