THE relationship between Palestinian resistance movements and Iran has long been shaped by a complex mixture of ideology, geopolitics, and necessity. While Iran remains one of the most consistent backers of Palestinian armed resistance, the political meaning of this alliance has evolved significantly over the decades.
For Palestinian movements, the issue has never been purely ideological. Instead, it has reflected difficult strategic choices in a political landscape largely defined by Western pressure, regional rivalries, and the realities of Israeli military dominance.
Understanding this relationship requires revisiting its historical roots.
From Revolutionary Solidarity to Political Distance
The relationship between Iran and the Palestinian national movement began shortly after the Iranian Revolution of 1979.
That same year, Palestinian leader Yasser Arafat became the first foreign leader to visit Tehran following the fall of Shah Mohammad Reza Pahlavi. During the visit, Iran symbolically handed the Israeli embassy building in Tehran to the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO), transforming it into the Palestinian embassy.
At the time, the relationship appeared promising. The revolutionary Iranian leadership saw the Palestinian cause as central to its regional vision, framing Israel as a colonial project and Palestine as a symbol of global anti-imperial struggle.
However, this alignment gradually weakened.
As the PLO pursued diplomatic engagement with Western governments and Arab states throughout the 1980s and 1990s, its relationship with Iran became increasingly strained. The shift was particularly evident following the 1993 Oslo Accords between the PLO and Israel, which established the Palestinian Authority and inaugurated a US-backed peace process.
Iran openly opposed Oslo, viewing it as a concession that legitimized Israeli occupation without guaranteeing Palestinian rights.
From that point onward, Iran’s strongest relationships shifted away from the Palestinian Authority and toward Palestinian resistance movements operating outside the Oslo framework.
Islamic Jihad: A Consistent Alliance
Among Palestinian movements, Islamic Jihad maintained the most consistent alignment with Iran.
Founded in the early 1980s by Fathi Shaqaqi and Abd al-Aziz Awda, the Palestinian Islamic Jihad (PIJ) developed ideological and political ties with Iran from its earliest years. The movement rejected both the Oslo process and the political compromises pursued by the Palestinian Authority.
For Islamic Jihad, the alliance with Iran was not merely tactical but strategic. The movement saw itself as part of what later became known as the “Axis of Resistance,” a regional network that included Iran, Hezbollah in Lebanon, and later several allied groups across the Middle East.
This relationship translated into financial assistance, training, and military support over decades.
Unlike other Palestinian factions, Islamic Jihad never wavered in its alliance with Iran, even during periods of regional turbulence.
Hamas and the Syrian Schism
The relationship between Hamas and Iran has been more complicated.
From the 1990s onward, Hamas relied significantly on Iranian financial and military support, particularly after the movement’s electoral victory in the 2006 Palestinian legislative elections and the subsequent Israeli blockade of Gaza.
Iran provided funding, weapons, and technical support that helped strengthen Hamas’ military wing, the Izz ad-Din al-Qassam Brigades. This support proved especially important during repeated Israeli wars on Gaza.
Yet the relationship suffered a major rupture during the Syrian war.
For years, Hamas maintained its external leadership headquarters in Damascus under the protection of the Syrian government. However, as the Syrian uprising escalated into a devastating civil war in 2011, Hamas found itself in an extremely difficult position.
Led at the time by Khaled Mashaal, Hamas attempted to maintain neutrality. But the escalating conflict and regional polarization made this balance impossible. Hamas eventually closed its Damascus office and distanced itself from the Syrian government.
Critics argued that Hamas had made a strategic mistake by aligning itself with what was widely perceived as the Sunni political camp in the region. Others within the movement insisted that the decision was not ideological but the result of circumstances that made neutrality impossible for Palestinian refugees caught in the Syrian war.
Whatever the motivations, the rupture significantly strained Hamas’ relationship with Iran and Hezbollah.
Repairing the Alliance
The process of repairing relations took years.
A key role in restoring communication was played by Islamic Jihad, which maintained strong ties with both Iran and Hamas throughout the crisis. Gradually, political dialogue resumed, and by the late 2010s, relations had largely normalized.
The leadership of Yahya Sinwar in Gaza played an important role in this process. Sinwar repeatedly emphasized the importance of Iran’s support for Palestinian resistance.
In a 2021 interview, Sinwar stated that Iran had provided the Palestinian resistance with “money, weapons, and expertise,” describing Tehran as one of the most important supporters of Gaza’s ability to confront Israel.
Sinwar was unusually direct on this point. After the May 2021 war, he publicly thanked Iran for supporting Hamas, then added a line that captured Gaza’s wartime logic more clearly than any diplomatic formula: “They weren’t with us on the ground. But they were with us.” T
hat distinction mattered. For leaders inside Gaza, alliances were not judged primarily by rhetoric, sectarian framing, or regional etiquette, but by who was willing to materially sustain Palestinian steadfastness under siege and war.
For many leaders inside Gaza, the relationship with Iran was judged primarily through the lens of material support during times of war.
Gaza’s Perspective
This difference in perspective helps explain internal debates within Hamas.
Leaders and officials operating outside Palestine often had to navigate the political sensitivities of the Arab countries hosting them. Maintaining relations with governments such as Qatar was crucial for humanitarian funding, political mediation, and media support.
Those based in Gaza, however, faced a different reality.
Under siege and repeated military assault, Gaza’s leadership often prioritized alliances based on tangible support during conflict. In this context, Iran’s role—along with that of Hezbollah and allied regional movements—was viewed as indispensable.
This is precisely why Gaza-based leaders often approached Iran differently from Hamas officials operating in Arab capitals. The latter had to navigate host-country sensitivities, media ecosystems, and political constraints. Gaza’s leaders, by contrast, were measuring alliances in weapons, battlefield endurance, and sacrifice. In that political universe, Iran was not an abstract regional actor, but a concrete source of strategic depth.
This divergence did not fracture Hamas but produced internal debates about geopolitical strategy.
A New Regional Test
The recent US-Israeli war against Iran, launched on February 28, has revived these debates within the Palestinian resistance.
Yet the political context today differs significantly from earlier moments of regional tension. The genocide in Gaza and the central role played by Palestinian resistance on the battlefield have strengthened the influence of Gaza-based leadership within Hamas and across the broader Palestinian resistance landscape.
In practical terms, this has meant that the perspective formed under siege and war—one that evaluates alliances primarily through the lens of material support and battlefield solidarity—has become more decisive in shaping the movement’s political discourse.
This was reflected clearly in the movement’s response to the latest escalation against Iran.
Hamas issued an official statement condemning the US-Israeli aggression, declaring that Iran was “paying the price for its steadfast support for Palestine and its resistance.” The statement framed the attack not simply as a regional confrontation but as part of a broader struggle against forces seeking to weaken the Palestinian cause.
Shortly afterward, Hamas’ military spokesperson Abu Ubaida reinforced the same message in a public statement, warning that Israel was committing “successive strategic mistakes” and emphasizing that the confrontation would only strengthen the resolve of resistance movements across the region.
Taken together, these statements reflected a political clarity that contrasts with earlier periods of hesitation or internal debate within the movement.
In the past, Hamas often attempted to carefully balance competing regional alliances, navigating between Iranian support on one hand and relationships with Arab governments on the other. The Syrian war, in particular, revealed how difficult that balancing act could become.
Today, however, the realities of the war in Gaza have shifted the center of gravity within the movement.
For leaders operating under siege in Gaza, alliances are measured less by diplomatic calculations and more by the willingness of partners to share the burdens and risks of confrontation with Israel.
In that context, the strong and immediate expressions of solidarity with Iran following the latest escalation suggest that the political hesitation that once characterized parts of Hamas’ regional strategy may now be largely a thing of the past.
Navigating a Polarized Region
Hamas now faces a delicate balancing act.
On one hand, the movement recognizes the geopolitical importance of its alliance with Iran and regional resistance movements in Lebanon, Yemen, and elsewhere. These groups have paid a heavy price in their support for Palestine.
On the other hand, the Gaza government continues to rely on humanitarian and political support from Arab states, particularly Qatar, whose media networks play a powerful role in shaping regional narratives.
Navigating these competing pressures will not be easy.
Yet as the current war unfolds, many within the Palestinian resistance increasingly believe that the regional balance of power may be shifting in ways that could reshape the strategic environment of the Palestinian struggle.
And if that proves true, the alliance between Palestinian resistance movements and Iran may become even more central to the future of the conflict.
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Dr Ramzy Baroud has been writing about the Middle East for over 20 years. He is an internationally-syndicated columnist, a media consultant, an author of several books and the founder of PalestineChronicle.com. His website is www.ramzybaroud.net.
