In 2026, American economist Jeffrey Sachs warned India against falling for 'America’s tricks' amid rising US tariff pressures
BASED on the most recent developments as of February 2026, the situation regarding a US-India trade deal is moving from a phase of “intent” to an interim agreement that addresses specific trade tensions. Still, a comprehensive Bilateral Trade Agreement (BTA) is still some distance from being finalised. The fine print on the final agreement could feel and be different from what is actually being discussed. President Donald Trump is notoriously unpredictable until the last comma, and a semi-colon is in place; we cannot declare that the deal is done and dusted.
India must take a firm stance of political autonomy and self-assertion – one that resembles the days of pre-NDA non-alignment. It must negotiate with the intent to achieve mutuality and inter-dependence. Neither the talks with the US nor the agreement with the EU demonstrates a like-mindedness where each gives and takes the best without surrendering integrity and interests.
The universal assessment is that US policy under Trump is subject to rapid shifts, while the policies of China and Russia are characterised by long-term consistency in international relations, particularly as evidenced during the 2025–26 period.
Observers, analysts, and foreign leaders have noted that Trump can quickly reverse his position on impulse. During his first term, he was known to adopt the viewpoint of the last advisor he spoke with.
He can flip at the drop of a hat. Trump frequently shifts policies to prioritise “deals” over entrenched alliances, often focusing on bilateral negotiations rather than long-term strategic frameworks.
In his second term, observers note a mix of abrupt, high-stakes actions, such as aggressive tariffs on allies and a swift, “shock-and-awe” approach to executive actions. His supporters often view this fast-changing approach as a strength, arguing it keeps adversaries off balance, while critics suggest it undermines international trust and predictability.
China’s Consistency
Under Xi Jinping, China operates on a 50-year plan focused on national rejuvenation, becoming a global leader by 2050. Despite changing tactics, Chinese foreign policy has maintained a consistent, assertive, and nationalistic identity since 2008, aiming to secure its territorial claims (e.g., South China Sea) and expand its global influence.
Chinese policy might be highly centralised and top-down, but its focus on long-term structural changes rather than reactive ones is consistent.
Russia’s Predictability
Russia’s foreign policy, under Vladimir Putin, focuses on reasserting itself as a great power and preventing Western dominance, with consistent goals spanning decades, including the protection of its “near abroad”. In terms of geopolitical alignment, Russia supports a multi-polar world and has consistently supported India in the UN Security Council.
Despite changing tactics in response to international sanctions or conflicts, the fundamental Russian pursuit of a multipolar world and opposition to NATO expansion has remained constant. Russia’s “Foreign Policy Concept” documents indicate a methodical, long-term strategic approach designed to maintain stability within its sphere of influence and counter Western influence.
Russia and China, unlike Trump’s rapid-fire approach, contrast widely with the deliberate, long-term, and “unbroken” strategies pursued by Beijing and Moscow, which are actively attempting to reshape the global order.
India-US Interim Agreement
On February 7, 2026, the US and India announced a framework for an interim trade agreement, addressing punitive tariffs that had raised tensions in 2025. The US reduced the effective tariff on Indian goods from a high of 50% down to 18%.
In exchange, India has committed to purchasing $500 billion in US products (energy, aircraft, technology, coal) over the next 5 years. India has also agreed to reduce tariffs on select US agricultural and industrial goods.
A major component of this deal involves India reducing its reliance on Russian oil and pivoting energy sourcing towards the US. This is not the long-term, comprehensive “Free Trade Agreement” (FTA) often discussed, but rather a “strategic interim framework” aimed at de-escalating trade tensions and boosting investment.
The 2025 “intent” stage – characterised by stalled negotiations and rising tariffs – has shifted to a transactional phase, where India makes specific, high-value procurement commitments in return for market access and tariff reduction. While commercial sectors benefit from lower tariffs, the deal is heavily driven by geopolitical alignment, specifically securing supply chains and reducing dependence on China and Russia.
The shift from 50% to 18% tariffs is a significant development. However, the complexity of the “interim” framework, which involves long-term, $500 billion, five-year purchase commitments, is often simplified in the media, making it difficult for the public to distinguish between a final “Free Trade Agreement” and this interim, strategic “deal”.
The current situation is best described as a strategic reset that replaces high-tension, punitive tariffs with a managed, transactional relationship, while both sides continue to work toward a broader BTA.
As of February 2026, the situation regarding the US-India trade deal and Russian oil imports is complex, with conflicting claims between Washington and New Delhi. While the US administration, led by President Trump, has claimed a major success in getting India to halt Russian oil imports, current reports indicate that India is reducing, but not completely stopping, these purchases, relying on a strategy of diversification to manage economic and energy security interests.
The US recently removed a 25% penalty tariff on Indian goods, which was imposed in August 2025 due to India’s imports of Russian oil. This move followed a framework for an “interim agreement” where India indicated it would purchase more energy, specifically from the US.
Despite claims that India would cease purchasing Russian oil, reports from early February 2026 show that India is still buying Russian oil, though volumes are decreasing. Russian oil remains economically critical due to deep discounts. India’s imports of Russian crude dropped to around 1.1–1.2 million barrels per day (bpd) in January 2026, down from a peak of over 2 million bpd in mid-2025. The goal is reportedly to drop this below 1 million bpd by March 2026.
India has maintained that its energy decisions are guided by national interests and energy security for its 1.4 billion people, refusing to confirm a total halt to imports. The US has warned that if India resumes, or fails to curb, Russian oil purchases, the punitive tariffs could be reimposed. While the “success” is being framed differently, a major victory in Washington and a gradual, strategic pivot in Delhi, Russia remains a source of oil for India, although the volume is significantly reduced from its 2025 peak. Russia remains a crucial supplier of advanced military equipment and spare parts, with defence ties extending to joint R&D (e.g., BrahMos) and a partnership valid until 2031. Russia has become a top supplier of discounted oil, which is vital for India’s economic growth and energy security.
Yet, the US is a partner that offers strategic possibilities in such areas as cutting-edge technology, AI, semiconductors, and space exploration through initiatives like iCET (US-India Initiative on Critical and Emerging Technology (ICET). The US is also one of India’s largest trading partners, offering massive investment opportunities and market access.
India seeks a policy of not aligning with any bloc, allowing it to navigate pressures from both sides. While relying on Russia for defence, India is rapidly diversifying its defence imports to include the US, France, and indigenous systems. India has managed “unsteady” periods, such as negotiating trade tensions with the US while maintaining strong ties with Moscow.
Conclusion
India’s strategy must disallow a partnership of blind trust and, instead, leverage both partnerships. Russia offers security against traditional threats and energy, while the US offers technology and economic, and strategic balance against modern threats. The goal is to navigate the volatility of both relationships to protect India’s self-interest.
Trump’s “America First” policy prioritises transactional, bilateral deals over traditional alliances, creating uncertainty but allowing for flexible negotiation on trade, particularly with China, which is seen as a major, albeit adversarial, economic force. Trusting a transactional approach involves accepting unpredictability, while shifting away from Russia or toward China carries significant risks, including isolation from traditional partners, the potential for economic disruption, and navigating intense competition for resources.
Trump’s approach is characterised by utilising economic, political, or military resources to secure favourable, immediate outcomes, often disregarding long-term, established alliances. While Russia is often viewed as a firm, predictable (though hostile) actor, a “warm” relationship with China presents a vastly different, complex economic reality. The US-China relationship is defined by intense competition and trade wars, but also interdependence, meaning a “warm” relationship requires complex negotiations over technology, trade, and regional influence.
By prioritising China, India could alter regional dynamics, including impacting the long-standing, complex relationship with Pakistan. A pivot toward or away from major powers like China can have profound impacts, including significant global GDP reductions if the world splits into competing economic blocs. A purely transactional foreign policy can lead to constant, short-term, high-stakes negotiations rather than a stable, predictable, international environment.
Ultimately, a shift toward a “warm” relationship with China is a strategic pivot that moves away from the traditional, alliance-based structure that has defined Western foreign policy for decades, replacing it with a pragmatic, transactional approach that seeks to balance economic gain with security risks.
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Ranjan Solomon is a writer, researcher and activist based in Goa. He has worked in social movements since he was 19 years old. The views expressed here are the author’s own and Clarion India does not necessarily share or subscribe to them. He can be contacted at ranjan.solomon@gmail.com
