Neha Dabhade
AT this point in history, India is at an uneasy crossroads. As the world’s largest democracy with both the potential and ambition to emerge as a global superpower and a leader on the international stage, the country simultaneously faces pressing internal and external challenges, chief among them being terrorism and religious extremism. The recent attack in Pahalgam shook the collective consciousness, deeply impacting the national psyche and bringing the subcontinent perilously close to the brink of a full-scale conflict between two nuclear-armed states.
In a recent article published in The Indian Express, Balbir Punj offers a sobering and nuanced analysis of these developments. He emphasises that the path to lasting peace lies in the promotion of education and moderation. Punj draws attention to a revealing statement by Lt Gen Ahmed Sharif, Director General of Inter-Services Public Relations in Pakistan, who underscored how Islam is not merely a matter of personal belief in Pakistan, but is institutionally embedded within the ideological framework of the military. Lt Gen Sharif explicitly states, “It is part of our faith… that iman, taqwa, jihad fi sabilillah (faith, piety, struggle in the name of God) drive us.” This articulation reflects the deep entanglement of religious ideology with the state apparatus in Pakistan.
Punj rightly warns of the dangers inherent in the conflation of religion and state, particularly in contexts marked by geopolitical volatility and social fragmentation. Such a fusion, he argues, is antithetical to the pursuit of peace and democratic stability. This observation serves as a crucial point of reflection for India as well. The emergence of religious nationalism and its growing influence on public discourse and policy in India warrants urgent and sustained introspection.
To fully comprehend the present dynamics of the Indian polity, it is essential to revisit the foundational ethos that shaped the emergence of the Indian nation-state. India was conceived in the historical context of a protracted anti-colonial struggle against British imperial rule, wherein a vision of composite nationalism took root — one that sought to unite people across religious, linguistic, caste, ethnic, and regional divides. The resolution of diverse communities to collectively constitute the Indian republic was grounded in the aspirational values enshrined in the Constitution: equality, liberty, and fraternity.
Unlike many nations that emerged along religious lines, India was deliberately not founded based on a singular religious identity. Instead, it was envisioned as a pluralistic and inclusive polity, committed to upholding democratic norms amidst vast diversity. This vision was particularly significant in the wake of the traumatic Partition, which unleashed widespread communal violence and left enduring scars on both India and Pakistan. In response to this historical rupture, India firmly embraced the principle of secularism. The Indian state was constitutionally mandated to maintain equidistance from all religions — neither endorsing nor privileging any particular faith, while simultaneously guaranteeing the right of all individuals and communities to practice and profess their religion freely. This secular framework was intended to ensure that the state would function as a neutral arbiter in a religiously plural society, thereby preserving the democratic and inclusive character of the Indian republic.
While Pakistan was born out of the two-nation theory promoted by the Muslim League, one can’t help but note that the notion was also promoted by the Hindu right-wing. Vinayak Damodar Savarkar, in fact, propagated the two-nation theory three years before the Muslim League passed a resolution in 1940. The underlying current of Hindu nationalism has been running parallel for over 100 years to India’s independence movement and to Constitutional democracy that came into being in 1950. This ideology of Hindu nationalism is steeped in the centrality of the Hindu religion, even to the exclusion of other religions. The RSS and the ideology of Hindu nationalism have been influential in India with or without state power.
In recent years, however, the influence of Hindu nationalist ideology has markedly intensified. This has manifested in a discernible blurring of the lines between state and religion, with increasing instances where the apparatus of the state appears to align itself with majoritarian religious symbols, narratives, and practices. The steady infusion of Hindu supremacist discourse into public institutions and civic life suggests a departure from the secular constitutional framework envisioned by the founders of the republic. Such developments raise critical concerns about the erosion of secular democratic principles and the potential reconfiguration of Indian nationalism along exclusionary religious lines.
It is significant to recall here that prominent ideologues of Hindu nationalism have constructed the idea of India based on the Hindu religion, as is clear through their writings. VD Savarkar, the tallest ideologue of Hindu nationalism, has in his work ‘Essentials of Hindutva’, traced the contours of the idea of the Hindu state, which underscores the supremacy of Hindus. He goes on to describe in great detail who is a Hindu. For him, three attributes are important to be a Hindu – common land (fatherland and holy land), common race or Jati as he calls it and common culture or Sanskriti. On the position of the non-Hindus in India, he explains, “But as long as in addition to our country, he has not adopted our culture and our history, inherited our blood and has come to look upon our land not only as the land of his love but even of his worship, he cannot get himself incorporated into the Hindu fold. For although the first requisite of Hindutva is that he be a citizen of Hindusthan either by himself or through his forefathers, yet it is not the only requisite qualification of it, as the term Hindu has come to mean much more than its geographical significance”.
He explains the significance of Jati and common culture as follows:
“They are not only a Nation but also a race-jati. The word jati derived from the root Jan to produce, means a brotherhood, a race determined by a common origin, possessing a common blood. All Hindus claim to have in their veins the blood of the mighty race incorporated with and descended from the Vedic fathers, the Sindhus… We feel that the same ancient blood that coursed through the veins of Ram and Krishna, Buddha and Mahavir, Nanak and Chaitanya, Basava and Madhava, of Rohidas and Tiruvelluvar courses throughout Hindudom from vein to vein, pulsates from heart to heart. We feel we are a JATI, a race bound together by the dearest ties of blood and therefore it must be so.”
He then goes on to explain why Muslims or Christians are not part of Hindu fold, “Many a Mohammedan community in Kashmir and other parts of India as well as the Christians in South India observe our caste rules to such an extent as to marry generally within the pale of their castes alone; yet, it is clear that though their original Hindu blood is thus almost unaffected by an alien adulteration, yet they cannot be called Hindus in the sense in which that term is actually understood, because, we Hindus are bound together not only by the tie of the love we bear to a common fatherland and by the common blood that courses through our veins and keeps our hearts throbbing and our affections warm, but also by the tie of the common homage we pay to our great civilization — our Hindu culture”
Taking off from Savarkar, Golwalkar in ‘We, or Our Nationhood Defined’, further clarifies on the question of the position of non-Hindus who are considered foreigners since their holy land is not India as, “The foreign races in Hindusthan must either adopt the Hindu culture and language, must learn to respect and hold in reverence Hindu religion, must entertain no idea but those of the glorification of the Hindu race and culture, i.e., of the Hindu nation and must lose their separate existence to merge in the Hindu race, or may stay in the country, wholly subordinated to the Hindu Nation, claiming nothing, deserving no privileges, far less any preferential treatment -not even citizen’s rights.” (Bharat Publications, Nagpur, 1939)
According to the biography of Hedgewar, ‘Dr Hedgewar, The Epoch Maker’, by BV Deshpande and SR Ramaswamy, Deshpande and Ramaswamy recounted that Hedgewar referred to Muslims as “yavana snakes” — using the Hindi term for Greeks, often applied to foreigners generally — and argued that they were “anti-national.”
The ideologues of Hindu nationalism have historically ascribed a central role to the Hindu religion in the conceptualisation of Indian nationhood. Within this framework, religious minorities — particularly Muslims — have often been cast as the “Other” or even as adversaries to the imagined cultural and civilisational core of the nation. Foundational texts and speeches by proponents of this ideology have explicitly articulated the view that non-Hindus could reside in India only if they accepted the primacy of Hindu religion and culture, or were willing to relinquish their distinct religious identities altogether.
Contemporary debates surrounding issues such as the wearing of the hijab in educational institutions, the implementation of a Uniform Civil Code, and the Waqf Amendment Act reflect the broader ideological impulse to homogenise cultural and religious practices under the rubric of a dominant Hindu identity. These legal and policy discourses, though framed within the language of uniformity and national integration, are frequently perceived as attempts to diminish the public visibility and institutional autonomy of minority communities.
Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi has, on occasions, upheld the primacy and iconography of the Hindu religion in public discourse. This includes him presiding over the Pran Prathisthan ceremony at the Ram Temple in Ayodhya, or donning saffron robes and meditating in the Kedarnath caves. In the public discourse, fear is a defining characteristic. The non-Hindus are portrayed as a threat to those following the Hindu religion. On 14th May 2024, Modi in Koderma, Jharkhand said, “It has become difficult to follow our faith in Jharkhand today. The idols of our gods are being destroyed. Infiltrators with a jihadi mindset are ganging up and attacking, but the Jharkhand government is looking away and is supporting them from afar. These infiltrators have threatened the security of our sisters and daughters.”
The prime minister in the past, too, has, through his words, demonstrated the secondary position that Muslims have in India. After the 2002 Gujarat riots, Modi was reported to have referred to relief camps for Muslim riot victims as “baby-producing centres” or “baby factories”, perpetuating the stereotype of Muslims as hyper-fertile and a demographic threat. “What should we do? Run relief camps? Should we open child-producing centres?” he went as far as comparing Muslims to dog puppies. He had said, “Even if I am in the back seat of a car and a puppy (kutte ka bachcha) comes under the wheels, isn’t it painful? It is. Whether I am a chief minister or not, I am a human being – I will be sad if something bad happens anywhere.”
Post the Pahalgam terror attack, which claimed the lives of innocent citizens, there were incidents of communal tensions and reports of discrimination and violence against Muslims in different parts of the country. The Pahalgam tragedy, which should have brought unity and a sense of humanity and social cohesion, brought out the simmering resentment towards the Muslim community and Islamophobia. Amongst the disturbing reports was one where a gynaecologist in Kolkata refused to treat a seven-month pregnant woman because of her Muslim identity. But this is not entirely surprising if fears about Muslims are whipped up routinely in public discourse. In May 2024, in Banswara in Rajasthan, Prime Minister Modi had cautioned against the Congress and Muslims, whom he referred to as infiltrators, “When they were in power, they said Muslims have first right over resources. They will gather all your wealth and distribute it among those who have more children. Do you think your hard-earned money should be given to infiltrators? Would you accept this?”
Statements made by the highest political leadership in a country play a significant role in legitimising the narratives and ideological objectives they endorse. In the context of India, the rise of Hindu nationalism — with its explicit aim of establishing a Hindu Rashtra — raises concerns about the increasing influence of religious ideology on state policy, a development that parallels the dynamics observed in Pakistan, as argued by Punj. For sustainable internal stability and regional peace, it is imperative to foster and strengthen liberal democratic values in both nations.
Violence begets violence. Similarly, democracy begets more democracy. India and Pakistan share a rich cultural and historical heritage, deeply rooted in the traditions of pluralism and shaped by the inclusive teachings of Sufi saints, which have permeated the collective consciousness and everyday life of their peoples. This shared legacy of diversity and coexistence holds the potential to counteract the forces of hatred and sectarian violence.
While it is important to remain vigilant about the rise of extremism in neighbouring countries, it is equally crucial to undertake sincere and critical introspection regarding the growing influence of Hindu nationalism within India. This phenomenon poses a significant threat to the foundational principles of secular democracy. Failing to apply consistent standards of critical reflection to our own polity, particularly the shift toward an exclusionary nationalist ideology, risks setting the nation on a trajectory marked by intolerance and communal polarisation. Such a path mirrors the very forms of religious majoritarianism that India has historically critiqued in other contexts.
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Neha Dabhade is associated with the Mumbai-based Centre for the Study of Society and Secularism. The views expressed here are the writer’s own, and Clarion India does not necessarily subscribe to them.
