IF there is one thing that now appears irreversible, it is that Iran did not lose the current war and that the United States and Israel have collectively looked irrational and overconfident in their predictions. The assumption that overwhelming military pressure would quickly subdue Tehran has not materialised. Instead, the conflict has exposed the limits of American coercive power in West Asia and revealed the dangers of strategic arrogance dressed up as certainty. It increasingly appears that Washington’s room for manoeuvre is constrained by Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu’s escalation strategy and the influence of the pro-Israel lobby within American politics.
For decades, Washington relied on military superiority, sanctions, diplomatic intimidation, and regional alliances to discipline adversaries into submission. Iran, however, neither collapsed internally nor retreated strategically. Tehran demonstrated that it possesses the ability to absorb punishment while retaining retaliatory capacity through missiles, regional alliances, proxy networks, and the strategic leverage associated with the Strait of Hormuz. This does not diminish the severe economic and human costs borne by ordinary Iranians under prolonged confrontation and sanctions.
Washington would almost certainly have explored backchannel pressure through actors such as China and Gulf intermediaries to prevent further escalation around the Strait of Hormuz.
The primary face-saving strategy available to Donald Trump is to declare victory by claiming that American military operations, including targeted strikes, achieved their intended objectives. Such an approach allows him to frame the end of the conflict as a calculated success rather than a retreat. Trump is likely to follow a familiar political pattern: loudly proclaiming success while simultaneously moving toward hurried negotiations behind the scenes. His administration will attempt to present the outcome to his political base as proof of strong leadership, even if critics interpret it as a strategic withdrawal under pressure.
Yet Trump faces a profound domestic contradiction that weakens his political room for manoeuvre. His political identity was built around promises to avoid “forever wars” and prioritise American economic recovery over costly military adventures abroad. A prolonged confrontation with Iran directly undermines that promise. Rising fuel prices, instability in global shipping routes, inflationary pressures, and growing public anxiety could rapidly erode support even among sections of his nationalist base. What may initially be marketed as patriotic strength can quickly come to be seen as reckless adventurism if ordinary Americans begin to experience sustained economic pain.
The deeper problem for Washington is that this conflict has reinforced a growing global perception that military supremacy alone no longer guarantees political outcomes. Across much of the Global South, Iran’s ability to withstand sustained pressure from both the United States and Israel has weakened the image of Western strategic omnipotence.
Such a framework would likely involve limited sanctions relief tied to maritime security guarantees and the stabilisation of shipping routes through the Strait of Hormuz. Trump could then present the outcome as a deal-maker’s success rather than a prolonged military entanglement.
But even this route carries risks. Beijing’s growing role as a potential mediator signals a changing geopolitical landscape in which the United States no longer enjoys a monopoly over diplomacy in the Middle East. If China, alongside regional actors such as Pakistan, Turkiye, or Gulf states, becomes instrumental in de-escalation efforts, Washington risks appearing less like the architect of peace and more like a reluctant participant compelled toward compromise. For a leader such as Trump, who thrives politically on projecting dominance and control, such optics are deeply uncomfortable.
Across much of the Global South, the conflict is being interpreted not merely as another Middle Eastern war but as evidence of a changing international order. Countries long subjected to sanctions, intervention, or Western diplomatic pressure increasingly view Iran’s endurance as symbolic of a broader resistance to unipolar power. Whether governments openly admit it or not, the perception that American coercive dominance can now be challenged carries enormous psychological and diplomatic significance.
Trump may also attempt to pressure allies, particularly Netanyahu, to reduce hostilities against Iran and Hezbollah while framing the move as a courageous effort to restore peace in the region. Yet this is where the contradictions within the US-Israel alliance become increasingly visible. The relationship between Netanyahu and the American administration shows signs of growing friction and shifting leverage, with divided opinions emerging over who ultimately shapes the direction of regional strategy.
Netanyahu has pursued an aggressive military approach across multiple fronts – Gaza, Lebanon, Syria, and Iran – often disregarding international pressure and repeated calls for restraint. Many analysts argue that Netanyahu has increasingly prioritised the survival of his coalition government and his own political future over immediate peace settlements. Military escalation, in this reading, has become both a strategic doctrine and a mechanism for domestic political survival. Netanyahu has also been associated with spoiling tactics that undermine negotiations at sensitive moments, including targeted assassinations or escalatory actions designed to derail diplomatic openings and reinforce more confrontational approaches.
Israel’s regional priorities do not always align with Washington’s wider global calculations. While Netanyahu’s government appears prepared to sustain prolonged confrontation to preserve military dominance and political survival, the United States must simultaneously manage tensions involving China, Russia, fragile global markets, and domestic economic pressures. The result is a growing perception that Washington is increasingly reacting to escalation rather than directing it.
Israel nevertheless remains deeply intertwined with the United States through extensive military, economic, technological, and diplomatic partnerships. Long-term military aid agreements, intelligence sharing, and cooperation on missile defence systems create a foundational level of interdependence that neither side can easily abandon. Washington also continues to provide Israel with crucial diplomatic backing in international institutions, frequently shielding it from growing international criticism and legal scrutiny. These ties ensure that bilateral stability remains a strategic priority even during periods of visible disagreement.
Far from restoring unquestioned American authority, the conflict has exposed fractures in Western credibility and limitations in military power. The assumption that forces alone can reorder political realities in West Asia now appears far less convincing than it once did.
The relationship between an Israeli Prime Minister and the United States administration has always involved a complex interplay of domestic political compulsions, strategic dependency, and mutual influence. While Israeli leaders often make tactical decisions based on coalition pressures and national security calculations, those decisions are inevitably weighed against the strategic importance of the American partnership. Rather than one side permanently holding all the cards, the relationship is better understood as one of continuous negotiation, leverage, and periodic tension in pursuit of overlapping – but not always identical – regional objectives.
The US-Israel relationship has always involved negotiation, dependency, and periodic tension shaped by overlapping – but not identical – strategic interests. Israeli domestic politics and American global priorities frequently intersect, but they do not always move in the same direction.
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Ranjan Solomon is a writer, researcher and activist based in Goa. He has worked in social movements since he was 19 years of age. The views expressed here are the author’s own and Clarion India does not necessarily share or subscribe to them. He can be contacted at ranjan.solomon@gmail.com
