THE United States is engaged in a high-stakes, “maximum pressure” strategy against Iran, characterised by intense military manoeuvring and last-ditch negotiations to prevent a full-scale war.
The administration has signalled that “all options are on the table” and has moved significant naval and air assets to the region — a buildup not seen since the 2003 Iraq invasion. But it has not yet initiated a full-scale war, opting instead for a “deal or strike” ultimatum. The US has deployed two aircraft carrier strike groups (USS Abraham Lincoln and USS Gerald R. Ford) to the Middle East, along with additional bombers, to create a credible threat of force.
Meanwhile, China and Russia have strengthened their strategic alignment with Iran, forming a united front against US influence in the Middle East, evidenced by joint naval exercises in the Strait of Hormuz, increased military cooperation, and economic support. While not a formal mutual defence treaty, they provide critical political and military backing to Iran.
Trump is aware that the alignment that Iran has achieved makes his task risky. He might be uneasy. This is probably why the US is weighing a “limited” military strike to dismantle Iranian nuclear capabilities, rather than an immediate, full-scale invasion.
There is ambiguity regarding whether the US goal is regime change, degrading nuclear facilities, or forcing a better deal. Clearly, the US is dithering amid its choices. The choice will affect the scope of planned action. Analysts and leaders warn that an attack could trigger a devastating, uncontrolled regional war involving Hezbollah, Houthis, and other proxy forces, potentially shutting down key oil shipping routes.
There are serious assumptions that Iran is fully capable of retaliating against US bases in the region. A prolonged conflict could clash with Donald Trump’s campaign promises regarding avoiding “messy foreign entanglements”. Trump is already harshly entangled in plenty of other internal political dynamics with his political opponents, the dissenting voices of people, the judiciary, and even his own partymen — which might even include an independent-minded Vice President pressing hard with his opinions when it comes to Iran.
The situation is characterised as a “15-day ultimatum” by some analysts, with both sides, as of late February 2026, on the brink of conflict while still manoeuvring for a diplomatic off-ramp.
Russia has reportedly provided advanced air defence systems (S-400) to Iran, while China has supported them with military logistics. The three nations are conducting joint naval drills to show solidarity. Both Beijing and Moscow have warned against US or Israeli military action in Iran, characterising it as a move against a strategic partner and to counter Western influence.
China remains Iran’s largest trading partner, offering a significant economic lifeline despite ongoing US sanctions. While supporting Iran, reports suggest there are limitations to this alliance, with some analysts noting China’s hesitation to invest heavily during high-risk, direct conflicts. This relationship is characterised by the parties as a move toward a “multipolar world order.”
The entire matter of whether Iran will take the next steps of developing nuclear armaments sounds flimsy to those who have thought through Iran’s civilisational values. A Shiite regime (specifically in the context of Iran) might not overtly “countenance” (approve of or openly support) nuclear arms due to a combination of religious-ideological, strategic, and economic reasons. A central argument is the fatwa, issued by Supreme Leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei, which declares the production, stockpiling, and use of nuclear weapons to be haram (forbidden) under Islamic law. The regime officially adheres to the viewpoint that all weapons of mass destruction (WMD) should be abolished, arguing that such weapons are inhumane and that a universal ban should be enforced.
Additionally, and at a more pragmatic level, Iran would not wish to pursue nuclear weapons, knowing it could lead to massive economic penalties and further international isolation, which could threaten the stability of the regime itself. Some arguments suggest that openly adopting a nuclear weapon programme could make the regime a target for pre-emptive military strikes by opponents like Israel or the US, rather than guaranteeing security. The regime operates within a global framework that stigmatises the use of nuclear weapons, making the public pursuit of such arms a severe diplomatic liability. But if push comes to shove, Iran can take the track less taken, and turn things upside down and show it has the prowess to go nuclear. After all, why should any nation in the world accept a state of nuclear apartheid?
The US and Israel, frequently challenging this position, argue that Iran’s nuclear advancements suggest a pursuit of weapons capability. Suspicions do not translate into facts on the ground. Moreover, Israel pursues dominance in the region and clearly wants to be the solitary nuclear power (undeclared, albeit) in the region.
That plan has boomeranged with the Saudis having concluded a Strategic Mutual Defence Agreement (SMDA) with Pakistan, signed by forming a formal security pact that includes a “nuclear umbrella” for the Kingdom. The deal strengthens a long-standing partnership, with Pakistan promising to defend Saudi Arabia against external threats. This signals a major shift in regional deterrence against rivals like Israel, or for that matter, Iran. It also reduces Saudi dependence on the US.
The US is facing a critical choice between pursuing a high-stakes military strike against Iran or brokering a deal, with a massive military buildup in the region currently enabling either option. While President Trump has indicated a potential deal could be reached within days, his administration is also prepared for a short, sharp, and potentially deceptive military intervention.
The administration has engaged in a significant military buildup in the Middle East. There are concerns that this could lead to a “war of choice,” relying on potentially exaggerated or false claims to justify action, similar to past interventions. Analysts suggest the US might aim for just a “short war”. It could be theatrical and optics in reality.
President Trump has threatened “bad things” if a deal is not reached, while simultaneously leaving the door open for negotiations, demanding a new, tougher agreement. While a short war could leave the US feeling victorious, concerns exist about the capacity for a long-term conflict. The US defence-industrial base faces challenges, making a protracted war difficult. Advisers are reportedly urging a focus on economic issues, highlighting the risks of escalation.
The decision hinges on whether the administration believes it can achieve its goals through threats and force projection alone or if a negotiated deal remains more advantageous.
————-
Ranjan Solomon is a writer, researcher and activist based in Goa. He has worked in social movements since he was 19 years of age. The views expressed here are the author’s own and Clarion India does not necessarily share or subscribe to them. He can be contacted at ranjan.solomon@gmail.com
